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Figure 1Heterogeneity,  Distribution  and Cooperation  in
Common  Property Resource  Management
1.  IntroductiQn
In many  settings  around the world, natural resources  are managed  under regimes
that can be described neither as private property nor as state control.  In the absence of ready
classification  into such easily recognizabl'Q  regimes, it may  be tempting,  and it has been tempting
for some, to classify these settings  as falling  into a single residual category. This category has
been labelled interchangeably  as "common  property" or "open access".  However, the burden
of a recently developed literature is that open access (res nullius) is different from common
property (res communes),  both conceptually  and in practice. The residual from private property
and state property is thus not one category but two.  This literature argues that the lack of a
distinction  has led not only to considerable  conceptual confusion,  but disastrous policy failure
as well.
The problems of open access were dramatized by Hardin (1968) in his famous
"Tragedy  of the Commons",  where he portrays  the negative  externality  that each herder imposes
on others as he adds extra animals to a pasture open to all. Clearly, the final outcome  of this
process, the non cooperative  equilibrium,  is inefficient--overgrazing  occurs and "freedom  in the
commons brings ruin to all."  The solution to the tragedy, according to Hardin, was either
private property rights or state control.
Hardin's metaphor has become  exceedingly  influential  in the debate on natural
resource management. All the more unfortunate,  then, as Bromley  (1991) notes in his incisive-2-
critique, that "it would be difficult to find an idea (a concept) that is as misunderGtood  as that
of the commons  and common  property".  Early critiques of the Hardin thesis are to be found
in Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and Dasgupta (1982). According to Bromley (1991), Gardner,
Ostrom and Walker (1990), and Dasgupta and Maler (1991), the crucial distinction  to be made
is that between the physical properties of a resource and the institutional  mechanisms  in place
for managing  it.  Many natural resources have the characteristics  that while the exploitation  of
the resource by one agent has a negative effect on other agents (subtractability)  it is cestly to
prevent such exploitation  (non-excludability).  The "commons"  in Hardin's allegory have these
characteristics. But these properties are to be distinguished  from the management  mechanisms
to deal with the problems  to which they give rise.
One management  mechanism  is simply  that of no management.  This is what leads
to "open access" and the outcome  is the inefficient  non-cooperative  equilibrium--the  "tragedy."
Two other mechanisms  are private property and state control. But there is a fourth mechanism,
that of common  property which, until recently, slipped  through the analytical  net.  This is the
case whei'  the natural resource is managed by a communal group that devises and enforces
control of c  oitation  of the resource.  As Bromley  (1991) notes, there are plenty of examples
of this mechanism:
"The European common fields,  the  common forests (Iriachi) in  Japan,  the
common pastures  in the Himalayas  and the Andes, Lid the Summer  pastures in the Swiss Alps
are examples  of common  property resources that were (and still are) certainly  not open to all for
indiscriminate  squandering.  Despite sweeping  predictions..., these common  propeny natural
resources have been well managed  for thousands  of years.  They are not mismanaged  precisely-3  -
because they are common  property resources."
Numerous  other examples of common  property regimes are given, for example,
in Ostrom (1990), Feeny et-al (1990) and National Research Council (1986).  The tragedy of
the commons  is not therefore, the tragedy of common  property management. It is a tragedy of
open access. It is argued by some  that the confusion  has cost dear.  Analysts  and policy makers
saw uncontrolled exploitation where in  fact there  existed indigenous institutions based on
common property.  They rushed to substitute state control for what they perceived to be no
control.  in the process, they ended up destroying the common  property mechanisms  that did
exist.  This might not have been so bad if state control had indeed worked. But in many cases
it did not, and a common  property regime was effectively  converted to open access, leading to
an even worse degradation  of the natural resource (Cordell  and McKean, 1986;  Messerschmidt,
1986). This misconception  followed  by policy failure might in fact be called the real tragedy
of the commons.
Tne last decade has seen an upsurge of research interest in common property
resource management  mechanisms. Detailed case studies of how externalities  are managed in
groups exploiting  natural resources have led to greater understanding  of the mechanisms. In her
important overview, Ostrom (1990) has attempted to  synthesize the literature and highlight
certain "design principles" that lead to  success.  These include, for example, clear group
boundaries  and memberships,  effective  monitoring,  and conflict  resolution  mechanisms. But an
impoAtant  conclusion from some of the case studies is that common property regimes do break
down, and for reasons that have nothing to do with wanton or misguided state intervention.
Changes in the economic environment  sometimes  put an intolerable  strain on the cooperative-4  -
mecherisms in place, and the common  property regime crumbles.
There are many types  of changes  il the environment  that can lead to a breakdown
of cooperative  agreements. One obvious example is an increase in group size through natural
population  increase.  As group size increases monitoring  becomes less effective. However, in
thic  paper I want to focus on one particular tension  in cooperative  agreements  - the conflict that
arises because  of heterogeneity  within the group, and the heightening  of this conflict  as a result
of external changes in the economic  environment.
The basic argument I want to make is intuitively  straightforward. In the presence
of an externality, a non-cooperative  equilibrium  will be inefficient.  By this, it is meant that
there exists an assignment  of actions  to each agent such that, if they all adhere to the agreement,
the group as a whole will be better off--the sum of the individual payoffs will be greater than
the corresponding  sum in the non-cooperative  setting.  If all agents are identical, then the
cooperative  agreement will entail identical assignment  of actions, and an identical increase in
each agent's payoff. The only question now is enforcing the agreement, since any single agent
could get an even bigger increase in payoff by breaking the agreement if no one else does.
Let us assume that the agreement  can be enforced--the  recent literature examines
the mechanisms  whereby this is achieved.  But suppose  now that the agents are not identical--
their payoff functions  differ.  There will still be an assignment  of actions to each agent which
will maximize  the sum of the payoffs.  But now the increment  relative io the non-cooperative
outcome  will differ across individuals. Indeed, for some individuals  there might not be an
increment at all - the payo'f when the individual undertakes  the action assigned to him in the
cooperative  agreement  may well be less than  his non-cooperative  payoff. Why then should this-5-
individual  agree to cooperate?
The answer given by the literature  is that there are side payments. Compensation
will ensure that no individual  is worse off by cooperating. Beyond  this, there is the issue of the
distribution  of gains from cooperation  when individuals  are not identical.  Various answers are
available in the theoretical literature.  For example, "Nash bargain" arguments could be used
to relate the distribution  to individual  payoffs  if cooperation  did not succeed. The potential  nen-
cooperative  outcome  could, therefore, influence  the distributional  consequences  of cooperation.
But if side payments  are possible and costless, then all that heterogeneity  in the group will do
is to determine  the distribution  of gains from cooperation  - it will not influence  whether or not
cooperation  takes place.
In a  series of conceptual and empirical studies, Libecap and associates have
argued that  side payments throw up  as  many difficulties as  the  monitoring of  action in
cooperative  agreements,  if no; more (for a summary,  see Libecap, 1989). Their premise is that
while side payment mechanisms  do exist they are at best incomplete. Thus, cooperation  that
leads to Pareto improvements  without side payments is most likely to succeed.  Following  on
from this, is  the thought that "inherent heterogeneity" in  the group is  thus an important
determinant  of whether or not cooperation  will take place.  Johnson and T-ibecap  (1982) have
put forward this idea, and applied it to fisheries where fishermen  differ in their inherent skills
in fishing. The argument, substantiated  by case studies, is that cooperative  agreements  such as
catch restrictions  are unlikely  to succeed.-6  -
Building  or this line  of inquiry, this paper considers  the consequences  of increased
within group heterogeneity for the sustai-ability of cooperative agreements.  As might be
expected from the above, it is argued that certain economic  developments,  that lead to greatly
increased divergence in the value that individuals  put on a natural resource, are likely to lead
to a break down  of cooperation  and a reversion  to the non-cooperative  outcome, even when there
has been no deterioration  ir, the effectiveness  of monitoring  or enforcement  of actions.
The next section sets out a  simple numerical example that crystallizes these
concerns. Section 3 considers  a number of case studies  that illustrate  the forces identified  here.
Section 4 concludes  the paper.
2.  A Numerical  Example
Consider two individuals, indexed 1 and 2, choosing actions y, and Y 2 that give
payoffs RI and R 2 as follows:
(1)  RI =  a,y, - Ay 1
2 y-  1/2 (yl  +  y2) 2
(2)  R2 =  a2y2 - '/2y 2
2 - /2 (y,  +  y2)2
The payoff functions  embody a negative externality,  in that each individual's action affects the
payoffs of the other individual  adversely.  They also contain an asymmetry  in the parameters
a, and a2--the marginal value of the action differs between the two individuals. The model  can
be interpreted as representing the exploitation  of a natural resource where private benefits are
a, y, and private costs are 1A2  y 1
2, but there is a common social cost that depends on joint
exploitation,  and Is given by 1/2 (yl  +  y2)2.-7.
The simplc  structure  allows for an explicit  solution of the Nash equibilrium. The
reaction functions  of the two individuals  are:
(3)  y, =  1/2 a, -'/2 Y2
(4)  Y2 =  1/2  a2 - /2 yl
The Nash equilibrium values of yi, superscriptvi  by N,  are thus:
(5)  y1N  =  2/3 a, 1 /3 a2
(6)  y2N  =  2/3 a 2 - '/3 a,
and the respective  payoffs are:
(7)  RIN =  1/18  [7a 1
2 - 4ala2-2a 2
2]
(8)  R 2N =  1/18 [7a2
2 - 4a,a2-2a,2]
The total level of resource exploitation  and payoff is given by:
(9)  yN  =  y 1N +  y  2N =  l/ 3 (al  +  a2)
(10)  RN =  R 1N  R  =  1/,8[5a 1
2 - 8a 1a2 +  5a2
2]
The cooperative  outcome maximizes  the sum of the payoffs by choice of y 1 and
Y 2, and leads to the solutions  y,C:(11)  ylC  =  3/8a,  - '/8a;
(12)  y,c =  3/%a,  - '/al
With these values of the control variables, and no side-payments,  the individual payoffs are
given by:
(13)  R1c  =  1/12 (35al 2 - i8ala2 - 5a 2
2)
(14)  R2  =  '/128 (35a 2
2 - 18ala 2 - 5a, 2)
The total level of resource exploitation  and payoff is thus:
(15)  yc  YIC q  y2C  1/4(al  +  a2)
(16)  RC  R,c +  R2C =  /64 [5al 2 - 6a 1a2 +  5a 2
2]
The objective of the exercise is to see how the different payoffs relate to one
another as the dispersion  between a, and a2 increases. We will do this by focussing  on the value
of a,/a2 = a.  Restricting  attention  to positive values of a, and a2, and requiring y, .nd y2to be
positive,
(17)  2 >  a  > ½h
by reference to (5) and (6).  Comparing  RN  and Rc from (10) and (16), a simple calculation
shows that Rc >  RN,  which  is as it sho ild be--cooperation  pays.  From (9) and (10), it is clear
that cooperation  pays because it restricts total exploitation. But from (5), (6), (11) and (12) it
is seen that the exter  of restriction differs:-9  -
(18)  y1N  ylC  =  1/24 (7a,  - 5a 2)
(19)  y2N - ylC  ='/24  (7a 2 - 5al)
Both individuals' exploitation  will be restricted only if:
(20)  7/5  >  Cf  >  5/7
Outside this range (but consistent with (17)) cooperation requires one individual to restrict
exploitation  and the other to intensify  exploitation  relative to the Nash equilibrium.
The above hints at a possible  distributional  conflict, and the key is whether  or not
side payments  are possible. If they  are  we can appeal  to the axioms  of Nash bargaining  theory,
and use RIN  and R 2N as threat points.  The Nash bargained payoffs resulting from cooperation
are then:
(21)  R  =/ 2 (RIN  R2 N) +  1/2 RC
(22)  R2B  /2(R2N - RIN)  +  1/2 Rc
Since Rc  >  RN =  R 1N  +  R2N, it  follows that RI'  >  RIN and R2B  >  R 2N.  This  is only  to
confirm that with side payments  the coonerative  outcome  ensures a Pareto improvement.
But what if side payment mechanisms are incomplete?  For sharpness, let us
suppose they are non-existent.  Then individual i will only agree to the actions (ylc, y2c) if Ric
>  RiN. Without  loss of generality let us consider individual  1.  It can be shown from (7) and
(13) that:- 10-
(23)  Rc  - RIN =  (a2
2/(128xl8))  [-266(a)2 +  188 (a)  +  166]
The sign of this depends  on
(24)  ,  =  -266 a.  +  188a  +  166
where a is restricted to lie between 1/2 and 2.
Figure 1 sketches X,  as a function of a.  It is seen that when a  =  1,  n,  >  0,  but as the
disparity between a, and a2 grows, there comes a point where the cooperative  agreement is no
longer beneficial to individual 1.  When a  >  1.2, 2,  <0.  By symmetry, when a  <  ('/1.2)  =
0.83,  n2  <  0.  Thus if:
(25)  0.83 <  a  <1.2
then both individuals  benefit from the jointly maximizing  patterns of resource optimization.
Outside  this range, however, one or the other of the individuals  loses.
Finally, notice  from (23)  how the benefits  from cooperation  change  as both a, and
a2 increase. It should  be clear that there is a close link between heterogeneity  and the effect of
an overall increase in the value of the resource.  If a  is  such that R,c -RN >0,  then an
equiproportionate  increase  in a, and a2 will increase  even further the gains to both parties from
cooperation. However, if a, and a2 are so disparate  that one party loses from cooperation,  then
rn  equi-proportionate  increase in  a, and a2 will further increases losses to  this party from
cooperation. Thus once again, the extent of heterogeneity  matters.- 11  -
The  above  example  suffices to  illustrate the  basic  intuition  that  greater
heterogeneity  makes it more and more difficult to ensure that the jointly optimal allocation of
actions is a Pareto improvement. Of course, this tension will be relieved to the extent that: (i)
side payments  are possible  or (ii) we do not ask  for the attainment  of the full joint optimum.
However, the  latter means that there is  less surplus to  finance the costs of  policing the
cooperative  agreement, while the former is also not without costs - it requires the presence of
related institutional  arrangements  that act as "conduits" for the side payments (Libecap, 1989;
Funr  jotn, 1989). It is seen form (24)  that the more  disparate  are the two  individuals,  the greater
will be the amount of side payment to be funnelled  through these institutional  devices. Even if
present institutional arrangements suffice for the side payments required, they may not be
adequate for a vastly increased need for side payments, occasioned  by greater heterogeneity.
This may in turn be caused by a change in the external environmen' which increases the value
of the natural resource disproportionately  to a  subset of the group.  The next section will
examine various case studies to see if this dynamic  is present il. practice.
3.  Selected  Case Studies of Common  Property Resource  Management
3.1  The Case Study Literature
While there  have been some limited attempts to  analyze common property
resource management  through  econometric  techniques  based on a large number of observations
(see  Migot-Adholla et-al,  1991), the  dominant form  of  empirical investigation of  this
phenomenon  is the case study method. This is not surprising, since identification  of monitoring
and enforcement mechanisms,  for example, require a detailed knowledge of,  and ability to
interpret, localized and specific behavior.  Participant observation  seems necessary, requiring
the build up of trust between the investigator  and those being investigated. On the other hand,- 12 -
case study  evidence  always raises the issue of isolated  occurrence  versus generalizable  findings.
To overcome this, Ostrom (1990) and associates have been attempting  to systematically  code
various dimensions  of individual  case studies. The task is made difficult  by the fact that many,
if not most, studies were undertaken  not necessarily  to elucidate the mechanisms  of common
property resource management. A study might have been conducted,  for example, to highlight
aspects  of symbolic  anthropology--and  it takes a certain  interpretation  and interpolation  to weave
together the observations  in the case study into a coherent picture of resource management. In
these situations  we are often twice removed  from the basic phenomenon--relying  firstly on the
interpretations  of the participant  observers and secondly  on the interpretations  of the case study
oriented common  property analyst.
However, despite these caveats, a formidable  consolidation  of case studies has
been taking place in the last few years.  Martin (1989) is a recent bibliography,  and Ostrom
(1990)  describes  a project to systematize  the findings  of case studies. Schlager  (1990)  and Tang
(1989) show  the insights  that can be gained from comparing  groups of case studies restricted  to
particular  resources: fisheries, or irrigation, for example. The compilation  of case studies  in the
National  Research Council (1986) speaks directly to resource management. In what follows I
use the information revealed by these studies selectively  to  demonstrate the importance of
heterogeneity  as a determinant  of the sustainability  of common  property regimes.  Of course,
it goes without saying that I  will not highlight other aspects--for example, the details of
monitoring  and enforcement  mechanisms  as emphasized  by Ostrom (1990).
3.2  Schlager  (1990): 30 Case Studies of Fisheries
Schlager  (1990)  attempts to systematize  the findings  of thirty chosen  case studies
of fishery management  from around the world- eleven in Central and South America, eight in
North America, seven in Asia, and four in Europe.  The documentation  for the case studies is- 13 -
examined  in detail and in-depth coding procedures are followed for each study, recording the
decision makine rules,  conflict resolution mechanisms, the stakes of  the participants, the
boundaries and physical characteristics  of the resource, etc.
Schlager's (1990) analysis reveals some fascinating and important correlations.
For  example, she finds that the existence of "assignment  externalities" (i.e. where there is
conflict over a limited number of choice fishing spots) is significanitly  related, in her 30 case
studies, to whether or not fisherman have an organized method of harvesting fish.  Similarly,
"technological  externalities"  (caused  by different  types  of fishing  gear) also increases  the chances
of organized fishing.
Schlager's (1990)  analysis does not have a particularly  strong focus on the main
concern of this paper - group heterogeneity. But some  of her generalizations  are suggestive:
"Among  the thirty-three  sub-groups  who  have organized  their harvesting  activities,
and for which there is information, twenty-six, or 84%, operate within a  stable economic
environment, whereas among the  eleven subgroups who have not  organized institutional
arrangements, five, or 50% operate within a stable economic  environment."
"Among  the sub-groups  that have  engaged in institutional  design, for which there
is information,  68% or 13, would receive moderate  to high returns for additional  units of fish,
and 32% or  6 subgroups would receive low retums for additional units of  fish harvested.
Among the subgroups  that have not organized, and for which there is information, 87% or 7
subgroups  would receive high to moderate  returns and 1 would receive low retums."
These observations  can be argued  to be supportive  of the general directions  hinted
at in the numerical  example of the previous section. They cannot of course be conclusive. As
we shall see, the same is true of a study of collective  action in irrigation systems.- 14 -
3.3  Tang (1992): 47 Case Studies of Irrigation Systems
Tang (1992)  presents  a synthesis  based on a careful analysis  of 47 case studies of
irrigation systems (see also Tang,  1991).  Like Schlager (1990), Tang derives a number of
important  generalizations  on performance  of the systems  in relation  to management  mechanisms
employed. Once again, group heterogeneity  is not a major focus of the analysis, but Tang has
more to say on this issue than Schiager.  For example, on the distribution of the gains from
cooperation,  Tang (1992) notes:
"Some commentators are  concerned that  indigenous organizations tend  to
perpetuate  inequalities  among farmers. They argue that the decision-making  processes  in many
of these communities are dominated by the elite in  the communities.  The poor and less
influential  farmers are usually disadvantaged  in their access to common pool resources in the
communities. An examination  of the sample, however, does not support  this contention. Only
four out of the 23 community  irrigation systems  in the sample  are characterized  by institutional
arrangements that are  specifically designed to favor one or  more group of irrigators over
another".
More to the point of this paper, Tang (1992) asks: "What is the variance of the
average annual income across families among  appropriators?" The answer is suggestive, and
supportive  of the line taken in this paper:
"In the sample of cases, a low variance of the average annual family income
among irrigators tends to be associated with a high degree of rule conformance and good
maintenance:  seventy-two  percent more of the cases  with low-income  variance  are characterized
by both a high degree of rule conformance  and good maintenance  than of the cases with high
income variance."- 15  -
This second  conclusion  may throw new light on the first--successful  schemes  are
to be found in relatively  homogeneous  communities,  and it is precisely  in these communities  that
one is unlikely to  find arrangements that favor one sub-group over another.  Tang (1992)
cautions the reader on these conclusions,  since they are based only on a subset of cases that
provided enough information  "for us to estimate roughly  the degree of income variance among
the irrigators."  Also, of course, there are multiple  determinants  of success or failure. Finally,
and this is also true of the Schlager  (1990)  overview, there is little discussion  of whether  or not
there are side payments  to relieve the tensions  of cooperation  with heterogeneity. For this one
must look to individual  case studies, and it is to these that we now turn.
3.4  Cordell and McKean (1986): Fishing in Bahia, Brazil
Cordell  and  McKean (1986)  present  an  extremely informative, in-depth,
ethnographic  study of sea tenure, which is defined as "collectively  managed informal  territorial
use rights in a range of fisheries previously  regarded as unownable". The field work relates to
the Bahian coastline in Brazil:
"Fishermen on the southern Bahian Coast still work mainly from sail canoes,
using customary lines, nets, traps, and cortals to harvest more than 200 different species  of fish
and shellfish.  They lay claim to extensive fishing grounds in the  1,000 kilometer strip of
shallow waters between Salvador and the Abrothos  Banks."
Given that fishing spots differ in attractiveness,  and the scope for conflict over
these spots and over gear interference,  there is scope for cooperative  agreements that establish,
and enforce, fishing rights.  Cordell and McKean  (1986)  provide a detailed  account  of the local
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing these rights, and show how they are  intimately
connected to local customs and mores, relying on an ethical code of respeito (respect).  For- 16 -
example, conflict resolution  requires that mediators  be found who are accorded due respect by
all parties ("They are usually retired fishing captains, or in some cases fishermen's widows.")
The case study also reveals practices that can be interpreted as side payment
mechanisms. A good catch leads to the bestowing  of fish on others, and the "holding  of beer-
drinking fests.  A bar floor littered with beer bottles at dawn is a sure sign that a fishing captain
has been celebrating  great good fortune and skill: empty beer bottles are valued storage
containers in  swamp-fishing  neighborhoods,  and to break them is considered  extravagant."
Cordell and McKean (1986) further detail the role of  "godparenthood networks" and the
reciprocity that they entail between access to fishing rights and godparenting.
The picture one has, therefore, is of a system of sea tenure as a cooperative
outcome maintained  by local sanctions  and side payment mechanisms. Cordell and McKean
(1986) go on, however, to discuss the breakdown  of these arrangements  as a result of external
influences:
"All that is required to  shatter the balance is for an external power to assert
domain--- or for a  local enclave to begin using competitive technology  ....  At that point,  the
internal code among local fishermen loses its own raison d' etre and breaks down since there
is no  longer anything for the local fishermen to  gain through cooperative fishing.  Such
encroachment  by inappropriate  gear and nonresident  boats  began in the early 1970s, when nylon
nets started to compete with traditional  gear for identical species  and water space ...  hundreds
of monofilament  nylon gill nets and seines were introduced  by the fisheries agency (SUDEPE)
which provided loans and tax incentives  for investors. This rivalry has altered the distribution
of  equipment in  Valenca and  the  concentration of  ownership in  the different categories
reprtsented.  As a  result of  encroachmnent,  rich nursery-area fisheries have been gravely
damaged, and short-term speculation  and overcapitalization  have led to sudden overfishing of- 17 -
a number of native estuarine and reef species."
The above account  is highly suggestive  of how external changes led to divergent
interests among  local fishermen. The existing institutions,  including  side payment mechanisms,
were clearly not sufficient  to prevent the breakdown  of long-standing  cooperation
3.5  Alexander (1982) and Ostroin (1990): A Sri Lankan Fishery
Ostrom (1990) relies on Alexander's (1982) study of  the  fishing village of
Mawelle  in Sri Lanka to analyze the breakdown  of cooperative  agreements. In what follows I
rely on Ostrom's account. She  describes  the net sequencing  procedures  drawn up among  beach
seines in the village, in response  to assignment  and technological  externalities. But  demographic
pressures and external changes in the economic  environment  led to a dramatic  deterioration  in
cooperation. Of particular importance  to us is Ostrom's observation  that:
"During the early  1940s, the construction of a new road linking Mawelle to
marketing  centers, the constructing  of an ice factory nearby, and the marketing efforts of the
Fish Sales Union greatly increased the demand for and market value of fresh fish.  Prices for
fish increased four-fold between 1938 and 1941 (Alexander  1982, p. 210).  Then the pressure
to introduce new nets really gained momentum... New entrepreneurs began to buy shares in
more than one net and to hire wage laborers  to work their shares. Thus, the ownership  patterns
were shifting  at the same time that the number of nets was greatly increasing. By 1971, many
of the owners  were not members  of the same kinship  group, owned shares in multiple  nets, and
hired wage laborers to work their share.  Further, the heads of several factions in the village
purchased shares both for the economic  returns they could obtain and as a means of providing
work for their loyal followers."
I would  argue that the above  account  is highly suggestive  of a dramatic  interaction- 18 -
between  an increase  in the value of the resource under consideraLion,  and pre-existing and new
heterogeneities  in the village. This interaction  led to an increasingly  divergent set of interests
and accounts  at least partly for the breakdown  in cooperation.
3.6  Johnson and Libecap (1982): North American Fisheries
As noted in Section 1, a series of papers * ,;_ becap and associates  have paid the
most explicit attention to heterogeneity  and cooperation. Johnson and Libecap (1982) present
an analysis for several fisheries in North America, paying particular attention to the Texas
shrimp industry.  This industry is  considered over  capitalized, and  the question is  why
cooperative mechanisms for catch restriction have not developed.  The answer provided by
Johnson and Libecap (1982) is that:
"Contracting  costs are high among  heterogeneous  fishermen,  who vary principally
with regard to fishing skill.  The differential  yields that result from heterogeneity affect the
willingness to organize with others for specific  regulations.... Indeed, if fishermen had equal
abilities and yields, the net gains from effort controls would be evenly spread, and given the
large estimates  of rent dissipation  in many fisheries, rules governing effort or catch would be
quickly adopted....  For example, total effort could be restricted through uniform quotas for
eligible fishermen. But if fishermen  are heterogeneous,  uniform  quotas will be costly to assign
and enforce because of opposition from more productive fishermen.  Without side payments
(which  are difficult  to administer),  uniform  quotas could leave more  productive  fishermen  worse
off."
Their institutional-empirical  analysir of various failures in regulating the  Texas
Shrimp fishery confirms the above argument.- 19  -
3.7  Wade (1986): Manaement of Irrigation in South India
Wade's (1986)  account  of resource management  in South Indian villages  provides
an interesting  account of irrigation and water control management. The basic problem is that
up stream farmers are better placed than those downstream, since the former can in principle
use a lot of water and leave  very little to flow to the latter.  In the villages  studied, Wade found
that irrigators are hired to allocate water.  Many aspects of this arrangement are analyzed,
including  supplemental  monitoring  and sanctioning  mechanisms,  and how the irrigators  are paid
for:
"Of course, if the power structure of the village were such that no collective
action could be sustained  without the agreement of a small number of households,  and if these
households  held all their land close to the irrigation  channel, then they would have no interest
.n rules of access.  In practice, however, holdings  are typically  scattered about the village area
in small parcels, partly to diffuse risk and partly because of inheritance  practices: a landowner
with a plot close to one irrigation outlet may have another plot close to the tail-end of a block
fed from another outlet.  This greatly helps the consensus on the need for rules and joint
regulation."
Wade's analysis  reveals  an interesting  dimension  of the heterogeneity/homogeneity
issue. While  the landowners  are undoubtedly  not identical, the very fact that they have scattered
plots engenders uniformity of interest in irrigation agreements.  Here, consolidation of the
fragmented  parcels (which some might argue for an the grounds of productive  efficiency) may
well lead to divergent interests and breakdown  of cooperation.
3.8  Harriss (1977) and Ostrom (1990): Management  of Irrigation in Sri Lanka
In contrast to Wade's (1986) account  of successful  irrigation management,  we- 20 -
have Ostrom's (1990) account  of the failure of irrigation  management  in certain projects in Sri
Lanka.  Using the work of Harriss (1977) in Kirindi Oya, Ostrom documents  and analyses the
factors underlying this failure.  These include the large number of  farmers involved and
technical  aspects  of the irrigation  system,  but Ostrom  highlights  the role of ethnic heterogeneity,
and also the role of wealthy farmers in controlling water by influencing  officials:
"Large landowners frequently captured the  major positions on  some of  the
cultivation Committees for Kirindi Oya and  obtained soecial privileges related to  water
distribution  through  internal influence  or by seeking  external political  intervention. None of the
participants in  the  Kirindi Oya project is  motivated to  do  anything but  follow dominant
strategies.  For the individual farmers, the only reasonable strategy to follow in a system in
which others steal water with impunity  is to flood their own fields as much as possible,
using whatever  means are necessary  to do so. For the large landowners,  keeping  active  political
contacts  with national leaders is one method  of ensuring some protection for illegal practices."
rhe cont;ast with Wade's (1986)  villages  could not be greater.  While there are
of course many differences  between  the two cases, from our perspective  what is important  is the
disproportionately  large return to big landowners  from extra water in the Sri Lankan case.  In
the South Indian case there was also inequality  of landholding,  but fragmentation  of holdings  vis
a vis the irrigation channel led to a "homogenization"  of the returns from cooperation when
compared to the non-cooperative  outcome.
3.9  Coward (1979! and Tang (1992): Irrigation in the Philippines
As a final example,  consider  Tang's (1992)  account,  drawn from Coward's (1979)
study of irrigation management  in Zanjera Danum in the Philippines, which again shows how
physical characteristics  of a system - whether historically  developed  or institutionally  chosen -- 21 -
can deliver sufficient  homogeneity  of interests to allow successful  cooperation:
"In some  community  irrigation  systems,  irrigators' associations  specifically  adopt
rules to ensure that members have fields in the lead, middle and tail portions of the major
canals.  For instance, within each watercourse  in Zanjera Danum in the Philippines, land along
a lateral canal is divided into several blocks perpendicular  to the source of water (Coward,
1979). The blocks thus represent  differential  distance  from the water source: some are near the
head of the canal, some near the tailend.  Each of the blocks is further divided into several
parcels.  Each share in the irrigation system is tied to one parcel in each block, so that each
share holder has to  cultivate parcels of  various distances from the  water  source.  This
arrangement creates an interest among all irrigators to help deliver water throughout the entire
watercourse.  "
4.  Conclusion:  Equity versus Efficiency Revisited
The general line of argument developed  in the introduction, and illustrated by
numerical  simulation  and by case studies  in the following  sections, speaks  to the age old question
of the relationship  between  equity and efficiency. If the argument has credence, it suggests  that
greater equity (at least, greater homogeneity)  promotes greater efficiency by facilitating the
adoption of cooperative agreements, in  situations where externalities make non-cooperative
outcomes inefficient.
Of course, in developing  the argument in its sharpest from, I have assumed no
side payments. But side payment mechanisms  are not without cost, and their non-existence  or
incompleteness  in practice may be perfectly explicable  in these terms (Furubotn 1989). Given
this incompleteness, nowever, theory and evidence would seem to suggest that cooperative
agreements are more likely to come about in groups that are homogeneous  in  the relevant- 22 -
economic dimension, and they are more likely to break down as heterogeneity along this
dimension increases.  In terms of the numerical example of section 2, compare the situation
where a,  =  2/3,  a2 =  1/3  with that where  a,  =  1/2,  a2 =  1/2.  From (25) we know that
cooperation  will not occur in the former case but it will in the latter.  In the first case the sum
of individual  non-cooperative  pay offs is given by (0),  as 1/18.  In the second case the joint
payoff is given by (16), as 0.22, which is clearly superior.
Equalizing  a, and a2 promotes  efficiency,  as well as equity  of course. The design
of the Zanjera Danum irrigation system in the Philippines, discussed in  section 3.9,  is an
illustration of this principle.  Disequalization  of a, and a2 leads not only to greater inequality,
but may  precipitate  a break down of cooperation. The disintegration  of agreements  in the fishing
village of Mawelle  in Sri Lanka (section 3.5), with resultant over fishing, illustrates this other
side of the coin.
Clearly, more work is needed  to further substantiate  the argument  advanced  here.
At the theoretical  level, the numerical  example needs to be generalized (Kanbur and Keen, in
preparation).  At the case study level, a more thorough trawl through existing case studies is
required, to identify  more specific  aspects  of distribution  and side payments. New case studies,
designed  specifically  to answer the questions  posed here, are also needed. In the meantime  there
is, prima facie, an additional  argument  for the complementarity  between equity and efficiency.- 23 -
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